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Abstract— In mobile ad-hoc peer-to-peer (M-P2P) networks,
economic models become a necessity for enticing non-cooperative
mobile peers to provide service. M-P2P users may issue queries
with varying constraints on query response time, data quality of
results and trustworthiness of the data source. This work pro-
poses ConQuer, which addresses constraint queries in economy-
based M-P2P networks. ConQuer proposes a broker-based incen-
tive M-P2P model for handling user-defined constraint queries.
It also provides incentives for MPs to form collaborative peer
groups for maximizing data availability and revenues by mutually
allocating and deallocating data items using a royalty-based
revenue-sharing method. Such reallocations facilitate MPs in
providing better data quality, thereby allowing them to further
increase their revenues.
Keywords: Economic model, Mobile-P2P networks, Roy-
alty model, data allocation, free-riding.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a Mobile Ad-hoc Peer-to-Peer (M-P2P) network, mobile
peers (MPs) interact with each other in a peer-to-peer (P2P)
fashion. Proliferation of mobile devices (e.g., laptops, PDAs,
mobile phones) coupled with the ever-increasing popularity
of the P2P paradigm (e.g., Kazaa, Gnutella) strongly motivate
M-P2P network applications. Incidentally, mobile devices with
support for wireless device-to-device P2P communication are
beginning to be deployed such as Microsoft’s Zune.
Suppose while driving through a busy street, John’s car
encounters a mechanical problem, thereby forcing him to
stop. Hence, he urgently looks for a car towing and repairing
service, which suggests that timeliness of data delivery is im-
portant to him. Here, data quality, which relates to the quality
of information concerning car towing and repairing services,
is also of major concern. Trust associated with the peer, from
whom John would receive the data, is also important e.g., he
would place more trust on a traffic policeman.
While cycling, suppose Jack receives a phone call from
his ailing friend Jim, who urgently needs some prescription
medication from a pharmacy. Moreover, his wife may send him
a message asking him to visit a plumbing company urgently.
At the same time, Jack is looking for a fast food restaurant
as he is hungry. Thus, constraints on timeliness, data quality
and trust are also applicable when users simultaneously request
multiple pieces of information. Notably, our target applications
mainly concern slow-moving objects e.g., cars on busy streets,
people moving in a market-place or students in a campus.
Moreover, our applications only consider read-only data items.
Users may issue queries with varying constraints on query
response time, data quality of results and trustworthiness of
the data source. For example, someone helping an injured
person needs information concerning hospitals quickly, hence
he places more emphasis on response time. However, a mobile
user looking for a song (as in a future mobile eBay market)
generally wants good data quality (i.e., good audio quality)
and high trust (i.e., legal copyrighted song version). Multiple
copies of a data item, such as a song, may exist at different
MPs with varying constraint values e.g., different data quality
and trust values. Such copies are not replicas since their
constraint values differ. We shall henceforth use the term
copies to distinguish such copies from replicas.
Incidentally, free-riding [3] is rampant in static P2P envi-
ronments, thereby necessitating an incentive-based model to
entice non-cooperative peers. For value-added services such
as constraint querying in M-P2P networks, incentives become
absolutely necessary to address limited energy, memory and
bandwidth resources of MPs for ensuring efficient and timely
query processing. However, existing M-P2P incentive schemes
[8] are not adequate to handle constraint queries as they do
not consider value-added routing services.
If a constraint query is processed by flooding the M-P2P
network, the user may not obtain an answer within his desired
timeframe and location due to mobility. On the other hand,
if a constraint query is processed by issuing multiple queries
with one constraint per query, the user could possibly receive
too many results. To obtain fewer results, the user could select
the first result or he could limit the TTL (Time-to-live) of the
query, but this would not provide him the result satisfying his
constraints at the cheapest price.
For facilitating constraint queries, we propose ConQuer,
the main contributions of which are three-fold:
1) It proposes a broker-based incentive M-P2P model for
handling user-defined constraint queries.
2) It provides incentives for MPs to form collaborative peer
groups for maximizing data availability and revenues by
mutually allocating and deallocating data items using
a royalty-based revenue-sharing method. Such reallo-
cations facilitate MPs in providing better data quality,
thereby allowing them to further increase their revenues.
3) It discusses the CR*-tree, a dynamic multi-dimensional
R-tree-based index which incorporates constraints re-
lated to the data quality, trust and price of data items
for determining target peers efficiently.
1-4244-1241-2/07/$25.00 ©2007 IEEE 
 
134
Each data item in ConQuer is associated with a price in terms
of a virtual currency. Data item prices depend on data quality
(e.g., image resolution, audio quality) and can be determined
using our previous work in [5]. ConQuer requires a data-
requesting MP to pay the price of the data item to the data-
providing MP, which entices MPs to become service-providers.
We define the revenue of an MP as the difference between the
amount of virtual currency that it earns (by providing services
e.g., providing data, relaying messages) and the amount that it
spends (by requesting services). Virtual currency is suitable for
P2P environments since transaction costs of micro-payments
in real currency are generally high [7].
In ConQuer, MPs form groups to collaboratively reallocate
data items using a royalty-based revenue-sharing method to
maximize data availability. This also increases revenues of
MPs as they make available higher quality data items by
removing excess low quality copies. This also enables Con-
Quer to efficiently address queries involving co-related data
items at a single MP or within few hops of each other.
In contrast, MPs individually would store only the hot data
items to maximize their own revenues, hence relatively less
hot data items would become unavailable. This would cause
queries with co-related data items to fail, thus resulting in
lost revenues. Thus, ConQuer provides MPs with an incentive
to maximize the revenue of the group as a whole, which
encourages non-selfish behaviour among them. Existence of
multiple peer groups ensures non-monopolistic pricing.
In ConQuer, peer collaboration is facilitated by broker MPs,
which collect bids from data-providing MPs and then pass
these bids to the query issuing user, who selects a single bid
and pays a commission to the broker in the selected query
path. Any MP can act as a broker to earn more revenue.
Each broker dynamically creates and maintains its own CR*-
tree index based on the queries that it intercepts so that it
can efficiently target MPs for answering constraint queries.
The CR*-tree indexes constraints in multi-dimensional space
involving data quality, trust and price.
Our performance study indicates that ConQuer is indeed ef-
fective in answering constraint queries with improved response
time, data availability and quality, and querying hop-counts.
II. RELATED WORK
The incentive scheme in [3] does not consider economic
models and brokerage to combat free-riding. Incentive mech-
anisms for static P2P networks assume peers’ availability and
fixed topology, which makes them too static to be deployed
in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). Interestingly, eco-
nomic ideas for M-P2P networks have been discussed in [8],
which proposes opportunistic dissemination of data in M-P2P
networks, while we address on-demand data dissemination.
Furthermore, brokerage is not considered in [8].
The E-DCG+ approach [2] for replica allocation in
MANETs does not consider constraint queries, economic
issues such as revenue models, incentives, prices of data items,
and it does not determine the optimal number of required
copies to maintain a reasonable response time.
III. QUERY PROCESSING ARCHITECTURE AND
CONSTRAINT INDEXING IN CONQUER
This section discusses the query processing architecture and
constraint index of ConQuer.
Query processing architecture
Peer groups can be formed by existing methods. In Con-
Quer, any MP can act as a broker to facilitate constraint
queries. For every query answered through itself, a broker
obtains a commission from the query issuing MP, which
provides an incentive for MPs to become brokers. Gateway
MPs select themselves as brokers because they can earn more
revenue by intercepting and facilitating queries arriving at or
going out of their respective groups. In ConQuer, broker’s
commission is 10% of the price of each data item that it
retrieves. To earn commission, brokers index the constraints
of a subset of the data items stored within their own groups
and try to keep as much information as possible about brokers
in other groups. To optimize memory space for index storage,
brokers decide which data items to index in several ways e.g.,
based on interests or commissions gained.
Each broker has an unique identifier, designated as bro-
ker id, which it periodically broadcasts to all the MPs (in-
cluding broker MPs) in its group. Periodically, the broker
with the lowest value of broker id is automatically selected
as the Master Broker (MB) of its group. Periodically, all
brokers in the group send access frequency information and
failed query statistics to MB. MB uses this information to
advise MPs about the objects to be reallocated periodically.
Each MP makes available only few data items to be shared
based on the amount of bandwidth that it would like to share,
but it has additional data items in the memory, which can be
made available during reallocation. We shall henceforth refer
to the data items that an MP makes available as the shared
data items, while the additional items in the MP’s memory are
called unshared data items. If an MP is currently located at
the intersection of multiple groups, it can choose to be a part
of one group for the purpose of allocation and deallocation of
data items, but it can serve as a broker for multiple groups.
ConQuer specifies the value DQ of data quality of an item
by adopting the ideas from our previous work in [4], which
relates DQ to image resolution by considering three different
levels of data quality, namely high, medium and low. Thus, the
value of DQ is assigned as follows. For high data quality, DQ
≥ 0.8; for medium quality, 0.5≤ DQ < 0.8; for low quality,
DQ <0.5. ConQuer computes the trust values of data items
by adopting the proposal in [6], which proposes a light-weight
decentralized reputation-based trust management mechanism
for ad-hoc P2P networks. ConQuer assigns the trust value
Trust of a data item as follows: For high data trust, Trust ≥
0.8; for medium trust, 0.5≤ Trust < 0.8; for low trust, Trust
<0.5. Thus, 0 ≤ DQ, Trust ≤ 1.
User queries Q are of the form {Qid, (k1,k2,...,kn),
Response, DQ, Trust, ρmax }. Qid is the unique identifier of
a query, and ki are user-specified keywords. Response is the
maximum tolerable query response time. DQ is the range of
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user-desired data quality, Trust is the range of user’s desired
trust value and ρmax is the maximum price that the user is
willing to pay for obtaining the query result. A user specifies
constraints based on his knowledge of queries that he relays.
A user broadcasts his constraint query Q. Each query has a
TTL (time-to-live) of 8 hops. Non-broker MPs simply forward
Q. A broker Bi receiving Q checks if its index contains the
data item(s) required by Q and if so, it puts its broker id into
the query message and becomes the broker for Q; otherwise, it
simply forwards the query. If a broker sees that a broker id has
already been appended to Q, it will simply forward Q. Thus,
only a single MP can act as a broker in a given query path,
thereby optimizing energy consumption of brokers. However,
as Q can propagate along multiple paths, multiple brokers
albeit in different paths could process Q, thereby providing
better fault-tolerance against unavailability of some brokers.
Each broker Bi issues a route-finding query to locate the
path to the target MPs likely to satisfy Q. Then Bi collects
bid information concerning price, data quality and trust values
for the queried data item(s) from each target MP, and then
returns the bid information to the user. From these bids, the
user selects the lowest-priced bid satisfying his constraints and
obtains his queried data item(s) via the broker. Finally, the user
pays the broker commission to the broker.
Indexing of Constraints in ConQuer
If each broker indexes only the data items stored at different
MPs, constraint queries may be unnecessarily sent to MPs
containing the queried data items, but not satisfying the
user-specified constraints. This motivates constraint indexing.
Query response time constraint cannot be indexed since it
depends upon network conditions. But the constraints of
data quality, trust and price can be indexed since they are
relatively static as they depend solely upon the data item. Thus,
constraints of each data item can be specified as a point in
3D-space, the dimensions being data quality, trust and price.
Constraint indexes are constructed by brokers based on queries
that they intercept, hence indexes may differ across brokers.
Fig. 1. Constraints in 2D-space
For clarity, Figure 1 provides the intuition concerning how
to index constraints in 2D-space with data item price and data
quality as the dimensions. Each point in Figure 1 indicates
the constraints of a given data item, while Q1 to Q4 represent
constraint queries with the queried ranges in parentheses. Since
multiple data items may satisfy the range of user-specified
constraints, such constraint indexing has the drawback of
unnecessarily retrieving non-queried data items, which satisfy
the respective ranges of user-specified constraints.
To satisfy our objective of retrieving only the queried data
items that satisfy user-specified constraints, we propose the
CR*-tree (Constraint R*-tree), which is a multi-dimensional
R*-tree-based [1] constraint index stored at each broker. The
constraints of each data item are represented by a point in
3D-space with data quality, trust and price as the dimensions.
The CR*-tree indexes this 3D-space. Non-leaf nodes of the
CR*-tree contain entries of the form (ptr, mbr, LL) where
ptr is a pointer to a child node in the CR*-tree and mbr is
3D-MBR (minimum bounding rectangle), which covers all
the MBRs in the child node. mbr is of the form {(xmin,
ymin, zmin), (xmax, ymax, zmax)}, the first and second terms
denoting the minimum and maximum values of the constraint
parameters in 3D-space. We specify a given data item using
one or more keywords. We shall henceforth use the terms
keywords and data items interchangeably. LL is a linked list
of such keywords within mbr. Entries in LL are sorted in
dictionary order to facilitate efficient retrieval.
A leaf node of the CR*-tree is an array of 3D-MBRs.
Each MBR contains entries of the form (mbr, LLl), where
the form of mbr is same as that of the non-leaf nodes. LLl is
a linked list containing entries of the form (keyword, freq,
arr MP), where keyword indicates the keyword of a given
data item within mbr. LLl is sorted in dictionary order of
the keywords. freq is the number of times keyword occurs
within mbr. arr MP is an array of the MPs that store the data
item. Thus, brokers process constraint queries by issuing 3D-
window queries on the CR*-tree. Brokers can reject unrealistic
user queries based on their knowledge.
IV. CONQUER: A PEER GROUP-BASED INCENTIVE MODEL
FOR CONSTRAINT QUERYING IN M-P2P NETWORKS
This section first discusses a greedy method in which all
MPs try to maximize their own revenues. To address the
deficiencies in the greedy method, we propose the peer group-
based method deployed by ConQuer for improving the overall
data availability, data quality and MP revenues.
Greedy method: Care-About-Me (CAM)
Under the CAM method, each MP M tries to make available
only those data items that will maximize its revenue. Let
the data items stored at M constitute a list D. M sorts D
in descending order of a parameter γ, which quantifies the
revenue-earning potential of a given data item. M greedily
fills up its available memory space with data items from D
(starting from the item with highest value of γ) until it has no
available memory space. While traversing D, if M encounters
a data item, whose size is larger than its available memory
space, it skips to the next item in D. Let access frequency
and price of data item i in D be acci and ρi respectively. γ is
computed as ( acci × ρi/ sizei ), where sizei is the size of i.
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Observe that CAM may lead to the duplication of the hot
data items across several neighbouring MPs, while other items
would become unavailable due to memory space constraints
of the MPs, thereby decreasing overall data availability. This
would also reduce the revenues of individual MPs due to
the total revenue for the hot data items being divided among
neighbouring MPs and/or due to query failures related to the
unavailable data items. Existing approaches [2], which allocate
replicas based on access frequencies of data items, cannot
reconcile such redundancy due to greedy behaviour of MPs.
Peer group-based method: Care-about-Groups (CAG)
To address the deficiencies of the CAM method above, we
propose CAG, which provides incentives for enticing MPs in
a group to store different (possibly co-related) data items as
well as improve data quality of existing items.
Estimating the number of copies for a data item: CAG
needs to determine the number of copies for a given data item
because eliminating all duplicates could cause queries with
response time constraints to fail. Recall that all brokers in the
group send data item access frequency information for each
query intercepted by them to the designated Master Broker
(MB) of the group. MB computes the total access frequency
acci of i by summing up the individual access frequencies
of i at each broker within the group. Given that sizei is the
size of i, MB initially computes the number Ki of copies for
i as (
√
(sizei × acci)). Then MB checks the response time
constraints on the failed queries on i to determine the failed
query (on i), which had the lowest response time constraint
Tmin. MB also determines the current average response time
Tavg of queries on i. Then MB computes the optimal number
K ′i of copies of i as follows:
K ′i = Ki(1 + (Tavg − Tmin)/Tavg ) (1)
where K ′i is the required number of copies of i, hence (K ′i −
Ki) additional copies of i need to be made available.
Royalty-based Revenue-sharing method for peer groups:
Suppose n MPs in a group are currently making available the
data item i. In practice, n would be typically much higher than
K ′i (evaluated from Equation 1) since initially, most of the
MPs would make available copies of the same hot data items
to maximize their own revenues as in the CAM method. (If n
equals K ′i, no action needs to be taken.) If n exceeds K ′i, we
proceed as follows. Given that the access frequency and price
of i at the jth MP j are acci,j and ρi,j respectively, the revenue
Revi,j generated due to i at MP j equals (acci,j × ρi,j).
The master broker MB sorts the MPs in descending order
of their values of Revi,j , and selects the top-K ′i MPs from
the sorted list. These top-K ′i MPs would make available i,
while the remaining (n - K ′i) MPs would replace their copy
of i and fill in the resulting available memory space with
some of their unshared data item(s). (Recall that each MP has
shared and unshared data items.) However, this may result in
increasing the revenues of the MPs that make i available, while
decreasing the revenues of the MPs which replaced i. We shall
henceforth refer to the MPs that make i available and the MPs
which replaced i as store-MPs and replace-MPs respectively.
Users generally want high quality data items, hence access
frequencies for high quality items is much higher than for low
quality items. Thus, an MP storing a high quality copy of an
item i generally earns higher revenues due to i than an MP that
stores a low quality copy of i. Hence, CAG’s selection of the
top-K ′i revenue-earners for i essentially implies that during
data reallocation, CAG replaces excess low-quality copies,
while keeping the high quality copies, thereby implying that
CAG improves the average data quality.
If the store-MPs pay a percentage of the revenues that
they earned from i to the replace-MPs, it would not be
economically viable. This is because replace-MPs would not
agree to give up their ‘hot’ data items just for receiving only a
small percentage of the revenues (as royalty) since they would
want to earn as much revenue as they were earning earlier by
storing the ‘hot’ data items. On the other hand, if the replace-
MPs demand the amount of revenue that they were earning
earlier from i, there would be no benefit for the store-MPs.
Replace-MPs would earn some revenue by making available
their previously unshared data items to fill up the available
memory space arising from replacing i. To evaluate the royalty
payment that must be paid by the store-MPs to a given replace-
MP k, we compute the difference between the lost revenues
of MP k (due to replacing i) and the revenues gained by MP
k due to making available new data items.
Computation of lost revenue of a replace-MP k due to
deallocating i: First, we estimate the future access frequency
of i during the next reallocation period. Suppose Pi,k is the
running probability of accesses to data item i at MP k during
the previous r reallocation periods (r = 4 was found to be a
reasonable value for our applications), t is the time of latest
access to i, and ti was the time when i was accessed during
the previous set of time periods. The running probability P ′i,k
of the data item i being accessed at a replace-MP k during
the next periodic interval is computed as follows:
P ′i,k = (C/(t− ti)) + (1− C)× Pi,k (2)
where C is a constant quantifying how much emphasis is given
to the previous probability of accesses to i when computing
P ′i,k. Preliminary experiments revealed that C=0.5 is a reason-
able value for our M-P2P application scenarios, hence we shall
use C = 0.5 for this work. Thus, we compute the predicted
access frequency S′i,k of i at MP k as (P ′i,k × prevacci,k ),
where prevacci,k is the previous access frequency of i at MP
k during the previous period. Given that ρi,k is the price of
i at MP k, the lost revenue of k (for the next period) due to
replacing i is (S′i,k × ρi,k). However, since the query issuing
user would have to pay 10% broker commission for each query
on i, MP k would have received only 90% of the price of i.
Thus MP k’s actual lost revenue due to replacing i would
be 0.9(S′i,k × ρi,k). For the next τ periods, MP k’s total lost
revenue LR due to replacing i is computed as follows:
LR = Στt=1 0.9× S′i,k × ρi,k (1 + λ)−t (3)
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where λ is the percentage increase or decrease in the access
frequency of the data item i (in the most recent period)
as compared to the moving average of the previous set of
reallocation periods. λ adjusts the royalty payment based on
the predicted increase or decrease in access frequency in the
next τ reallocation periods. Preliminary experiments showed
that τ = 4 is a reasonable value for our application scenarios.
Computation of revenue gained by a replace-MP k due to
making available some data items from its set of unshared
data items: Recall that MPs have shared and unshared data
items (see Section III). A given replace-MP k makes available
some of its unshared data items to fill up the available memory
space due to replacing i. MP k selects data items, which it
wants to make available, by examining past access statistics
to determine items on which queries had failed. Given that ρi,k
is the price of an unshared data item i at MP k and acci,k is
the number of times a query failed to obtain i during the last
reallocation period, the lost revenue of the replace-MP k due
to a failed query on i is (ρi,k × acci,k). First, MP k sorts all
its unshared data items in descending order of the revenues
lost (due to failed queries) into a list Lf . Then it fills up
its available memory space with data items from Lf (starting
from the item with the highest value of lost revenue) until it
has no available memory space. While traversing Lf , if MP k
encounters a data item, whose size is larger than its available
memory space, it simply skips to the next item in Lf .
For each (previously unshared) data item now made avail-
able by MP k, k computes its future access frequency during
the next reallocation period using Equation 2, which can be
used in this case because i was missed, which implies that i
was accessed. Now, MP k computes its predicted revenue α
gained due to making available new data items as follows:
α = Σpi=1 (0.9× ρi,k × acci,k) (4)
where ρi,k and acci,k are the price and predicted access
frequency of the ith newly shared item for the next reallocation
period, while p is the number of such newly shared items.
The factor of 0.9 arises due to the 10% broker commission as
explained for Equation 3. For the next τ periods, MP k’s total
gained revenue GR due to making available new data items
is computed as follows:
GR = Στt=1 α (1 + λ)
−t (5)
where the significance of τ and λ are same as in Equation 3.
Computation of the royalty to be paid to replace-MP k by
the store-MPs: Using Equations 3 and 5, the royalty revenue
RYi that must be paid by the store-MPs making i available to
the replace-MP k, which replaced i, is computed as follows:
RYi = LR − GR (6)
Since access frequency increases in i at each store-MP cannot
be predicted in advance, RYi is equally divided among the
store-MPs. Thus, if K ′i store-MPs make i available, each of
these store MPs will pay (RYi/K ′i) to a given replace-MP k.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In our experiments, MPs move according to the Random
Waypoint Model within a region of area 1000 metres ×1000
metres. In all our experiments, 20 queries/second are issued in
the network, the number of queries directed to each MP being
determined by the Zipf distribution with Zipf factor (ZF) of
0.7. Bandwidth between MPs varies from 28 Kbps to 100
Kbps, while probability of MP availability varies from 50%
to 85%. Data item sizes range from 50 Kb to 750 Kb, while
memory space of each MP varies from 2 MB to 5 MB. Speed
of an MP varies from 1 metre/s to 10 metres/s.
Our experiments consider 100 MPs. Each MP owns 4 shared
data items and 4 unshared data items. (Unshared data items
play a role only for CAG during reallocation.) Among the total
of 400 shared data items, the number of unique data items is
40. (The number of unique unshared data items is also 40.)
Hence, there are 10 copies per data item and these copies are
assigned different constraint values of data quality and trust
as follows. Given y different copies of the same data item, we
generate the data quality mix by using the Zipf distribution
with zipf factor of 0.7 over 3 buckets. The numbers generated
for the first, second and third buckets are for low, medium and
high quality respectively. The data trust mix is also generated
similarly. These constraint values of data quality and trust are
















Fig. 2. Improvement of Data Quality
Data item(s) to be queried are selected randomly from
the entire set of data items in the M-P2P network, the Zipf
distribution being used for determining the number of queries
corresponding to each of the data items. 60% of our queries
involved single data items, while the other 40% concerned
between 2 to 5 data items, as determined by a random number.
Recall that data quality and trust are in the range (0,1). We
normalized price values to be in the range of (0,1) by dividing
all prices with the price of the highest item in the network.
For each query, the constraints were generated by selecting
a random number between 0 and 1 corresponding to each
constraint. The response time constraint for each query was
between 40 seconds and 120 seconds, the exact value being
based on a random number. Communication range of all MPs
is a circle of 100 metre radius. Periodically, every 200 seconds,






































(c) Average Query Hop-Count
Fig. 3. Performance of ConQuer
Performance metrics are average response time (ART) of
a query, data availability (DA) and average querying traffic
(QTR). Suppose Ti is the time of query issuing, Tf is the time
of completion of download of the queried data item(s) at the
query issuing MP, and NQ is the total number of queries. ART
equals ((1/NQ)
∑NQ
i=1(Tf − Ti)). Since our computation of
ART includes the time required for downloading the queried
data item(s), we consider ART only for successful queries. DA
equals ( (NS/NQ)×100 ), where NS is the number of queries
that were answered successfully, and NQ is the total number
of queries. QTR is the average number of hops per query.
Incidentally, none of the existing proposals for M-P2P
networks address peer group-based incentive models. As refer-
ence, we adapt the E-DCG+ approach [2] to our scenario since
it is the closest to our proposed CAG method. E-DCG+ is
executed at every reallocation period. We also compare CAG
with CAM.
Improvement in data quality
We define average data quality as ( ( ΣDi)/ni ), where Di
is the value of data quality for the ith copy of a data item i,
and ni is the total number of copies of i in the network. We
randomly selected a data item whose average data quality was
low i.e., 0.3. CAG’s peer group collaboration using the royalty-
based revenue-sharing method facilitates MPs in improving
their revenues by collaboratively removing excess low-quality
copies during the reallocation of data items. Hence, the average
data quality for CAG improves over time as indicated by
the results in Figure 2. Since CAM does not perform such
collaborative reallocation, its average data quality remains
constant over time. This experiment does not consider E-
DCG+, which does not address data quality issues.
Performance of ConQuer
Figure 3 depicts the performance of ConQuer. The first 4000
queries were used to obtain access statistics, and then the three
approaches were deployed. ART decreases for each approach
and eventually plateaus after some time due to each approach
creating its own optimal number of copies of data items in
response to the given access pattern. Both CAG and CAM out-
perform E-DCG+ as their incentive-based models encourage
MP participation, hence their total available memory space and
total bandwidth are higher, thereby implying higher DA. The
CR*-tree used by CAG and CAM finds target MPs efficiently,
so CAG and CAM incur lower QTR and ART than E-DCG+.
CAG outperforms CAM as its peer group collaboration
via the royalty-based revenue-sharing method ensures better
data allocation, which leads to higher DA. In contrast, CAM
encourages MPs to make available only the hot data items,
hence less hot data items become unavailable, thus constraint
queries with co-related data items fail due to unavailability
of some of the data items. CAG’s allocation enables queries
on co-related data items to be answered at a single MP or at
multiple MPs that are within few hops of each other, which
reduces its ART and QTR. Unlike CAM, CAG decides the
number of copies for a given data item based on response time
constraints posed by the queries, which optimizes its ART.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed ConQuer, which addresses constraint
queries in economy-based M-P2P networks. ConQuer pro-
poses a broker-based incentive M-P2P model for handling
user-defined constraint queries. It also provides incentives for
MPs to form collaborative peer groups for maximizing data
availability, data quality and revenues by mutually reallocating
data items using a royalty-based revenue-sharing method.
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